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STRICT LIABILITY AND THE MILITARY PLAINTIFF
The development of strict liability has destroyed the "citadel of
privity,"' has nullified the doctrine of caveat emptor, and has created
new protection for the consumer.2 The question now may be asked
whether this concept can be used to establish potent civil relief for an-
other segment of the population-the soldier.
To date there is no definitive answer. An indication of what this
answer may be, however, can be gleaned from several cases involving
servicemen injured or killed by defective military products. These
cases point out numerous defenses which are formidable obstacles to
recovery. The defenses determine whether strict liability will be an ef-
fective remedy for the serviceman, or merely a toothless tiger.
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,3 provides a
basis for an analysis of the attempted expansion of strict liability to en-
compass military products. In Montgomery the United States Navy air-
ship Reliance, a two-engined dirigible, crashed into the ocean 16 miles
off the coast of New Jersey, killing most of the servicemen aboard.4 The
personal representatives of eleven of the deceased servicemen brought
actions against three non-governmental defendants for wrongful death
under the Death on the High Seas Act.5 They alleged that the manu-
facturer of the airship and the manufacturer of the fabric used for the
airship's envelope were negligent because the seams of the balloon were
1. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966).
2. The liability of those who deal in products, which when defectively made
cause injury or death has been extensively discussed elsewhere. For this definition of
products liability, see McCune, Maritime Products Liability, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 831,
832 (1967). See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). Three different theories have been used to
establish this liability. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (warranty); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence).
3. 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Montgomery v. Goodyear
Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968).
4. Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777, 778 (2d Cir. 1968);
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Other products liability cases involving servicemen include: Whitaker v. Harvell-
Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969); Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1967); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1961); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
5. Whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or de-
fault occurring on the high seas, the decedent's personal representative may maintain a
suit for pecuniary loss against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
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improperly constructed. They also contended that the manufacturer
of the dirigible's warning system was negligent because the warning
bell did not sound when the balloon began to lose air. In addition to
negligence they alleged a breach of the implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability." Finally they contended that the defendants were
liable for their decedents' conscious pain and suffering under the state
survival statute.
7
In their motion for summary judgment the defendants answered
that admiralty did not recognize an action for personal injuries and
death against a supplier based on breach of implied warranty. Even if
the action were recognized, they contended, privity of contract was a
necessary requisite." There had been much disagreement on these is-
sues in the federal district courts.9 The court appeared to rely on a re-
cent Supreme Court decision which held that an implied warranty of
workmanlike service based on a contract between a shipowner and a
stevedore included liability without fault.10
Thus, the district court in Montgomery concluded that a cause of
action for a breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability
would lie in admiralty, because the theory of this warranty is similar
to that of the warranty of workmanlike service-both attempt to allo-
cate losses to the enterprise most capable of minimizing the risk.':
Further, the court held that privity of contract was not required in an
action for breach of implied warranty.' 2
The manufacturer of the warning system contended that the pro-
ducer of a component part could not be held liable for a breach of im-
plied warranty. The court agreed, relying upon Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corporation.'8 In Goldberg the New York Court of Ap-
peals had allowed a wrongful death action based on breach of war-
ranty against the manufacturer of an airplane. It did not, however,
permit the plaintiff's action against the manufacturer of the airplane's
altimeter, holding that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy against the
6. These theories were used to assess liability in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 371, 161 A.2d 69, 76 (1960). See note 2 supra.
7. 231 F. Supp. at 449.
8. Id. at 452.
9. Compare Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962),
with Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
10. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315 (1964). The unseaworthiness doctrine, a form of liability without fault, has also
allowed recovery without proof of negligence. The shipowner's duty to a seaman to
furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute, neither predicated on negligence nor satisfied
by the exercise of due care. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539
(1960); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
11. 231 F. Supp. at 454.
12. Id. at 455.
13. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
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airplane manufacturer. Although noting that a federal court sitting
in admiralty is not bound by a state court's decision, the court in
Montgomery stated that "the similarity of facts in Kollsman and in the
case at bar is so overwhelming that the reasoning of the case should be
applied here."
14
Since the Death on the High Seas Act only permits recovery for
pecuniary loss,15 the manufacturers contended that the plaintiffs could
not recover for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering. This argu-
ment was rejected, however, since federal courts sitting in admiralty
had previously allowed state survival actions for pain and suffering un-
der the act.
16
With the exception of the action for implied warranty against the
manufacturer of the warning system, the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment was denied in all respects. Although it appears that
Montgomery may significantly expand the liability of a manufacturer of
military products, allowing recovery without proving fault, the subse-
quent disposition of the case weakens the force of the decision.
The claims against both the manufacturer of the fabric which
covered the dirigible and the manufacturer of the warning device were
dismissed at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' direct case. The plaintiffs
had neither proved that the airship burst open in the air, nor that the
accident was caused by a manufacturing defect, and judgment was en-
tered for the manufacturer of the dirigible. On appeal, which reviewed
only this failure of proof, the judgment was affirmed. 17 Although the
survivors of the deceased servicemen did not recover, they did obtain
a trial on the merits based on a theory of strict liability.
The Montgomery decision's effect upon the development of prod-
ucts liability in admiralty law has been discussed elsewhere.' 8  Al-
though the theory of liability is important, defenses asserted by manu-
facturers will also affect the serviceman's right to recover. In their mo-
tion for summary judgment and at the subsequent appeal, the manu-
facturers in Montgomery raised formidable objections which servicemen
will have to overcome in any case of strict liability.
14. 231 F. Supp. at 455.
15. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1964).
16. 231 F. Supp. at 452. For a discussion of the application of state survival
statutes in admiralty, see Jurisdictional Problems of Maritime Tort Actions: Application
of State and Federal Remedies, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 470 (1969).
17. Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968).
18. McCune, Maritime Products Liability, 18 HASTIN's L.J. 831, 837-38 (1967).
For recent decisions determining the scope of products liability in admiralty, see
Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969); Krause v.




The manufacturers contended that the public policy considerations
governing contracts between the United States and weapons suppliers
preclude suits by injured servicemen against the suppliers. These con-
siderations, they argued, included the necessity of superiority in the
armaments race,'" the requirement of immediate supply, and the sacri-
fice of safety research which necessarily accompanies accelerated de-
velopment of new weapons systems.20
After reviewing these questions of national defense, the court
stated:
We recognize that in some cases, certain safety factors must be
disregarded in order to explore new possibilities in weaponry.
Similarly, it may be true that complete knowledge of all possible
safety problems cannot be obtained because of the speed with
which these weapons must be completed.
21
However, the need to quickly manufacture the airship was no license for
defective work. Thus, the plaintiffs could attempt to prove the manu-
facturers' liability for the death of these servicemen.22 When there is in-
sufficient time to manufacture a safe military product because of mili-
tary necessity, it would be unjust to hold a manufacturer strictly liable.
This defense, however, should not be a shelter for defective manufacture.
The protection of servicemen from injury or death due to defectively
manufactured products is vital to the national defense.
B. Governmental Control
The defendants in Montgomery further contended that they were
not liable because agencies of the United States controlled the manu-
facture of the dirigible.2 3 The proximate cause of the accident could not
be determined until more specific information concerning the extent of
governmental control and supervision of the manufacturing process was
shown. For example, the court asked:
Did Government personnel prepare the seams of the ship? Did
Government direct, either by contract or through inspectors, the
exact method to be used to seal the seams?
24
The issue of governmental control was not resolved in Montgom-
ery. The questions asked by the court, however, indicate concern about
the nature of the specific acts performed by Government personnel. It





23. Id. at 451.
24. Id.
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would be unfair to hold a manufacturer strictly liable when the United
States completely controls the manufacturing process. It would appear,
however, that a limited degree of governmental control should not au-
tomatically shift the manufacturer's responsibility to the United States.
C. Assumption of Risk
In Montgomery the manufacturers further argued that the Navy
servicemen killed in the crash had assumed the risk25 because they had
volunteered for flight duty and had received a higher rate of pay. The
court, however, rejected this argument and held that the decedents'
knowledge of the hazard was a question of fact which had to be deter-
mined at trial. It is interesting to note what the court considered the
relevant questions in determining assumption of risk:
What were they told about their airship? When they decided and
volunteered to fly, were they told they would fly aircraft in which
safety factors were limited And if they knew this was an ad-
vanced design airship, were they made aware of a possible break in
the seams? 2
6
From the type of questions asked, it appears that the court would not
allow the defense of assumption of risk unless the servicemen had spe-
cific knowledge of the particular hazard. Even if they did have such
knowledge, it could be argued that it would be against public policy
to penalize a serviceman for assuming a risk which benefits the national
defense.
D. Governmental Immunity
1. The Feres Doctrine
On appeal it was noted that the manufacturers had also asserted
the defense of governmental immunity according to the doctrine of
Feres v. United States.2 7 Since appellate review in Montgomery was
limited to failure of proof, the court did not decide the validity of this
defense. It is also unfortunate that the report of the case did not in-
clude the arguments by the defendants. Nevertheless, this defense
may be a barrier to recovery since governmental immunity has prevented
suits by servicemen against the United States. As a result the Feres
decision provides a basis for understanding the legal effect of the inter-
relationships which bind the manufacturer, the serviceman, and the
United States.
25. For a discussion of the defense of assumption of risk in products liability
cases, see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 839-40 (1966); Baker v. Rosemurgy, 4 Mich. App. 195, 144
N.W.2d 660 (1966).
26. 231 F. Supp. at 451.
27. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
January 19712 STRICT LIABILITY
In Feres the United States Supreme Court reviewed three cases in
which military personnel had been injured or killed by the negligence
of other members of the armed forces. Suits were commenced pursu-
ant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,28 which allows suits against the
United States for the torts of its employees. The Supreme Court held
that the United States could not be held liable for the injuries or death
of servicemen arising out of activities incident to their military service.29
The Court stated:
The primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those
who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already
well provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.
30
Federal law provides that a serviceman who has been injured in
the line of duty and has received a discharge other than dishonorable is
entitled to Veterans Administration benefits, which include both medi-
cal care"' and compensation. 32  Compensation may also be provided
for the widow, children, and dependent parents of a serviceman killed
in the line of duty.33 The Supreme Court concluded that these statutory
benefits provide an adequate remedy that precludes the serviceman from
suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 4
In Montgomery the Government contract included a provision by
which the United States agreed to indemnify the manufacturer of the
airship for any recovery against it.38  As a result the practical effect
of a recovery against the manufacturer of the dirigible would be the
same as a serviceman's recovery against the United States-a result
which is forbidden by the Feres doctrine.36 It may be argued, how-
28. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
29. 340 U.S. at 144-45.
30. Id. at 140.
31. 38 U.S.C. § 610 (1964).
32. Id. § 310.
33. Id. § 321.
34. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950); accord, United States v.
Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969); Van Sickel
v. United States, 285 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1960).
35. Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777, 778 n.1 (2d Cir.
1968).
36. However, it can be argued by analogy that the Supreme Court does not for-
bid a person from recovering indirectly where he could not recover directly. A long-
shoreman, injured on a ship, may sue the shipowner for unseaworthiness. The
shipowner may be entitled to indemnity from the stevedoring company, which em-
ployed the longshoreman. Since the longshoreman is not permitted to sue his em-
ployer, although he is entitled to compensation from him, he will be able to obtain
additional money by prosecuting an action against the shipowner. As a result the
stevedoring company may have to pay more money than required by the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
For a discussion of this technique see Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1955); accord, Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423
(1959).
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ever, that after 20 years the practical effect of the Feres doctrine should
also be reevaluated. Federal benefits are based on the serviceman's
ability to work;"' thus, he is not entitled to recovery for pain and suf-
fering. Because he does not receive money for private medical care,
he must rely on Veterans Administration facilities. 3 18 Full compensa-
tion for the serviceman's injuries should be the most important consid-
deration, not the liability of the United States for indemnity.
2. Liability of a Component Part Manufacturer
Where an agency of the United States is the manufacturer of the
military product, another obstacle to recovery is presented. A case
subsequent to Montgomery considered this problem and provided a sig-
nificant solution.
In Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corporation,39 a serviceman in the
United States Navy was injured aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Con-
stellation near Okinawa. This aircraft carrier had been manufactured
by the United States Navy. It appears that on August 19, 1963, a mili-
tary airplane attempted to land on the carrier by hooking onto arresting
cables on the flight deck. The plane failed to stop and crashed into the
ocean killing the pilot.40
The serviceman on the flight deck was struck in the legs by a cable
that had broken loose because of a defect in the arresting equipment. In
a suit against the manufacturer of this equipment, the serviceman al-
leged a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for use arising out of
the sales transaction between the manufacturer and the United States
Navy.41 On a motion to dismiss because of a failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted the federal district court considered
whether or not the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability
are recognized in admiralty for injuries sustained in a maritime
tort, and if so, whether they run against a component part manu-
facturer.42
Since the aircraft carrier was manufactured by the United States
37. See 38 U.S.C. § 314 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970); 38 C.F.R. § 4.1
(1970).
38. See 38 U.S.C. § 610 (1964).
39. 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 270
F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
40. In the same accident which occurred in Sevits, the pilot of a military air-
plane was killed when he attempted to land on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Con-
stellation. The pilot's wife has initiated a suit for wrongful death under the Death on
the High Seas Act. To date there has not yet been a trial on the merits. There has
only been published the decision to deny plaintiff's motion to add an additional de-
fendant. Craig v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 413 F.2d
854 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1970).
41. 264 F. Supp. at 811.
42. Id. at 812.
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Navy, according to the Feres doctrine the injured serviceman could not
recover from the United States. Unless a valid claim had been stated
against the manufacturer of the arresting equipment, the plaintiff would
not be able to recover for a breach of implied warranty.43  Giving rec-
ognition to this fact, the court denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, holding that in the interest of justice and fairness the injured serv-
iceman had a right to assert the theory of implied warranty against the
manufacturer of the component part, but only in the limited situation
where the manufacturer was shielded from liability by governmental
immunity. 44
According to Sevits, an important means of recovery has been
created for servicemen. In this situation, where an agency of the United
States manufactures the defective product, a serviceman is still pre-
cluded by Feres from suing the United States. According to Sevits,
however, he may then proceed against the manufacturer of the compo-
nent part. As a result, this limitation of the Feres defense may increase
the liability of manufacturers of military products.
The serviceman in Sevits has not yet had a trial on the merits.45
Until all the issues which were mentioned in Montgomery are actually
decided at trial and reviewed by an appellate court, it is debatable
whether a serviceman can recover in admiralty. Although the prece-
dent value of the decisions in Montgomery and Sevits is limited, they
both permitted military plaintiffs to maintain an action in strict lia-
bility against the manufacturers of military products.
II. Recovery Under State Law
Admiralty law may be applied if a maritime tort has been com-
mitted. 46  But, because injuries from defective products may occur
within state boundaries, state law may be controlling. Since each state's
products liability law varies, the law of the forum may also present an
obstacle to recovery. A current case, which applies a state law rather
than admiralty law, illustrates this problem.
A. The Whitaker Decision
In Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corporation,47 an enlisted man in
43. Id. at 814. A later case held that the Feres decision barred an action when
three servicemen in the United States Navy Air Reserve were killed in a helicopter
crash. Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 380 F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir. 1967).
44. 264 F. Supp. at 814.
45. Sevits v. McKieman-Terry Corp., 270 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction over the
McKiernan-Terry Corporation.
46. G. GiMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAW oF ADMiRALTY 41 (1957).
47. 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969), petition for rehearing denied, 424 F.2d 549
(5th Cir. 1970).
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the United States Army was injured while undergoing basic training at
Fort Benning, Georgia. On November 23, 1966, he was required to
throw a live hand grenade as part of his military training. The grenade
prematurely exploded, seriously injuring Whitaker.4 s He sued the man-
ufacturer of the grenade and the manufacturer of the grenade's fuse
for $750,000. Against both manufacturers, Whitaker alleged negli-
gence in manufacture and inspection, breach of implied warranty of
suitability, breach of express warranty, and strict liability in tort. Both
manufacturers moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. After the federal district court sitting in Georgia
entered an order dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff appealed. 49
On appeal the defendants alleged that the serviceman was not
entitled to a trial according to Georgia law50 under any theory of prod-
ucts liability, including breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, and
negligence. Whitaker did not have an action for breach of warranty
because he had not satisfied Georgia's strict requirement of privity."1
Georgia also did not follow strict liability in tort. The appellate court
held, however, that the serviceman did have an action against these man-
ufacturers for negligence.52
This decision indicates that the choice of forum may seriously
limit the serviceman's right to recovery. Because of Georgia's conflict
of laws rule, Georgia's law of products liability will determine the out-
come of the case,53 even though the product was manufactured in
Texas. As a result, the doctrine of strict liability in tort, which has
48. Id. at 1012.
49. Id. at 1012-13.
50. Id. at 1015-18. The defense of sovereign immunity was asserted by the
grenade manufacturer. Id. at 1015. The court's analysis of the defense is significant
since servicemen will have to overcome it whether the suit is based on negligence or
strict liability. The manufacturer operated the Lone Star Ammunition Plant at
Texarkana, Texas. The United States owned the plant, including all the land, build-
ings, machinery and equipment. The manufacturer was requihed by the United
States to make only a visual inspection of the component parts. Assembly of the
grenades followed government specifications under the active surveillance of govern-
ment inspectors. The manufacturer contended that on the basis of the above, it was
an instrumentality of the United States and was thus protected by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
The court rejected this argument and found that the manufacturer was not an
agent of the United States. The court's decision was based on a provision in the
contract specifically stating that the manufacturer was an independent contractor, and
on Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950), a previous case in-
volving the same plant, in which the Supreme Court held that independent contractors
still have managerial responsibility.
51. Id. at 1018.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1017. Since the court of appeals only reviewed the lower court's
order to dismiss, the final disposition of the case is yet unknown.
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been adopted by Texas, 4 was not applied.
B. Negligence-A Forerunner of Strict Liability?
Negligence has proved a viable theory of recovery against the
manufacturer of a military product. In Boeing Airplane Company v.
Brown,", a member of the crew of a B-52 military jet bomber was
killed when the airplane exploded and crashed near Tracy, California.
An action for negligence was brought against Boeing Airplane Com-
pany, the manufacturer of the airplane, on behalf of the decedent's
son."0 Appling California law in accordance with Washington's con-
flict of laws rule, the federal district court sitting in Washington found
that
... Boeing was negligent in designing manufacturing and as-
sembling the airplane with a defective and inadequate alternator
drive and in supplying and delivering the airplane for use as it was
then constructed, knowing it would be flown in such condition.
5T
Judgment was entered for the plaintiff for $26,000. On appeal the
trial court's decision was affirmed.58
Although the manufacturer of the airplane was held liable, the
Boeing decision was based solely on negligence. Thus, it has limited
precedent value for holding strictly liable a manufacturer of a defective
military product. At the time of this decision in 1961, however, Cali-
fornia did not follow strict liability in tort; this theory of recovery only
requires proof that the product was defective, and requires no proof
that the manufacturer was negligent.59 In 1963 California did adopt
strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 0 and it
would appear reasonable that if Boeing had been decided 2 years later,
the court would have applied strict liability according to the Greenman
decision.
1I. Conclusion
Montgomery,"' Sevits,62 and Whitaker3 have attempted to expand
54. Id. at 1018. A federal district court, assuming jurisdiction on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, must apply the substantive state law as determined by the forum
state's conflict of laws rule. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
56. Id. at 312.
57. Id. at 313.
58. Id. at 319.
59. For a discussion of the development of products liability in California, see
Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAsTNcs L.J. 9 (1966).
60. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
61. Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), affd sub nom. Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968).
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the doctrine of strict liability to include servicemen. Would such an
expansion be desirable? It is relatively easy to pinpoint the conflicting
interests, but difficult to strike a just balance. The manufacturer takes
business risks and conforms to government specifications. In contrast,
the serviceman is exposed to the continuing danger of death or great
bodily injury due to defective products. With the development of so-
phisticated technology, however, the individual, civilian or military,
needs more rather than less protection against the threat of defective
products.
Clearly not all military products are advanced weapons systems.
Trucks, 4 automobiles, 65 tires,66 tools,6" ladders,68 and even carpets,69
to mention but a few, are the same whether used by a civilian or by a
serviceman. If one of these products injures a businessman or a house-
wife, for example, the manufacturer can be held strictly liable in most
states.7 0  It would appear to be unjust that a person would be barred
from similar recovery solely because he is a serviceman. Even if spe-
cial allowances are made for military necessity, it still appears that a
large number of situations involving military products should come
within the scope of strict liability.
The purpose of strict liability is not to impose unreasonable lia-
bility upon manufacturers, but to insure that injured persons, often-
times powerless to protect themselves, receive compensation for the
cost of their injuries resulting from defective products.7 With the
62. Sevits v. McKieman-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 270
F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
63. Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969), petition
for rehearing denied, 424 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1970).
64. See, e.g., Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965).
65. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
66. See, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1968).
67. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
68. See, e.g., Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 143 (1966).
69. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965). However, certain civilian products have strong associations with military serv-
ice. For cases dealing with these types of products, see Krause v. Sud-Aviation, 301
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aird, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969) (helicopter);
Block v. Urban, 166 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (bow and arrow); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 132 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (rifle).
70. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
15 (1966).
71. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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extension of products liability, the tragedies due to defective military
products may be exposed to the glare of civilian scrutiny, rather than
relegated to the bureaucratic caverns of the Veterans Administration.
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